It is trite that where the wife in a customary marriage declines to cohabit with her husband, and is being induced by another man (who is willing to marry her) to break the marriage, the girl’s family, on obtaining the husband’s consent to the breaking of the marriage, refund to the husband all his expenses on customary fees and presents. Upon the new suitor’s reimbursing the family in the same amount, he is deemed to be validly married to the girl ?

Native custom was established in the case of………...that Native customary law is peculiarly within the knowledge of the native courts, and the opinion of a superior native court on native custom must be preferred to the opinion of an inferior native court, unless it is either contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court or the Privy Council on the point, or is “repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience” (section 87, Cap. 4). Nothing of the foregoing applies to the present case, and the learned judge should therefore have refrained from disturbing a decision of the superior native court upon a question of native customary law ?

That though the plaintiff was not head of his family, the evidence was that he had the family’s authority to take care of the family property. From this fact might be implied the family’s authority to litigate the family’s title to the family property ?

It has been held that upon an unmarried girl’s pregnancy, if the putative father on enquiry admits liability and sends drink to her family, and then sends them a further drink or present (however trivial), the acceptance of the latter by the family concludes a marriage valid in customary law, for the sending of the second present is a request for her hand, and its acceptance is the family’s consent?

That where a man desires to marry, he applies to the woman’s family for consent, taking to them certain customary gifts which vary according to his means. If the family give their consent by accepting the gifts, that concludes a marriage valid in customary law ?

That the plaintiff having pleaded ownership of the land, the defendant having denied that averment in her Statement of Defence and the plaintiff having joined issue with the defendant thereon, the onus of proof lay on the plaintiff, for it was he who would fail if no evidence were led after the close of the pleadings?

That compensation ordered on conviction does not operate as a bar to subsequent civil proceedings if it is ordered to be paid out of a fine imposed?

That the defendant being the successful party in that suit, he should have been granted his costs therein?

That in the absence of proof of a custom (in a particular Ga family) different from the ordinary Ga custom, the ordinary principle must be applied, viz., that for purposes of succession to a Stool or to other traditional office, succession runs in the paternal line; but for purposes of succession to property, succession runs in the maternal line?