Since an accused was under no obligation to prove his innocence nor would a lie on his part absolve the prosecution from its duty of proving its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, whether an accused relied on a specific defence or not, where on the evidence, any legitimate defence was open to him, it was the duty of the trial judge as provided by section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) to consider it, however, stupid or weak it might appear to him to be. Thus in the instant case, since the defence of “a claim of right made in good faith” was available on the evidence to the appellant, not- withstanding [pg 468]his denial that he had not sold the car, the trial tribunal erred when it failed in its duty under section 177 of Act 30 and disregarded that defence merely because the appellant did not specifically rely on that defence. Since that defence negatived dishonest appropriation by the appellant, the prosecution had failed to prove the charge of stealing against him. Accordingly, he was entitled to be acquitted.