Section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) conferred general matrimonial jurisdiction on a court where either party to the marriage (a) was a citizen of Ghana; or (b) was domiciled in Ghana; or (c) had been ordinarily resident in Ghana for at least three years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings. In the instant case, even though the naturalisation of the petitioner as an American citizen had changed her political allegiance, the dictates of citizenship were different and distinct from those of domicile. Naturalization was a question of law but domicile was a question of fact and depended on the intention {Pg 44} to make a permanent home in a particular country. Since there was no evidence that the parties had abandoned their domicile of origin acquired at birth and intended to or had acquired a new domicile of choice, the limited right of stay due to their visa regulations did not mean an automatic loss of domicile until and unless they were actually deported from the country. Moreover, the petitioner’s evidence showed clearly that even if they had acquired a new domicile of choice in America, they had now abandoned it. In the result, her domicil of origin which was deemed to have been held in abeyance had been revived. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction over the matter. Cru/t v Cru/t (1945) 115 UP 6; Zanel/i v Zanel/i (1948) 64 TLR 556, CA and Garty v Attorney-General [1951] P 444 cited.