Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, p. 218, defines special damages as compensation for special damage which is not presumed by law to be the natural and probable or direct consequence of the act or omission complained of but which does in fact result in the circumstances of the particular case and of the injured party’s claim to be compensated. Similarly, in the landmark case of Stroms Bruks Aktie Bolag v. Hutchison [1905] A.C. 515 at 525-526, H.L. (S.C.) Lord Macnaghten said: “… Special damages’ … are such as the law will not infer from the nature of the act. They do not follow in ordinary course. They are exceptional in their character, and, therefore, they must be claimed specially and proved strictly.” In our view, the essence of a claim for special damages lies in the fundamental principle that the party seeking such damages must establish, with credible evidence, the fact of the occurrence of the loss and the degree of damage experienced as a result of the loss. It would be both absurd and a grave miscarriage of justice for us to endorse the argument of the Defendant that, despite the Plaintiff having incontrovertibly proven the demolition of her building, the appropriate measure of special damages should be limited to the historical cost of constructing the property rather than the current cost of rebuilding it. Special damages are intended to place the injured party in the position they would have been in but for the wrongful act, and in this case, that necessarily entails awarding the Plaintiff the amount required to reconstruct the demolished structure, not merely the outdated sum originally expended on its development. In the circumstances we shall uphold the Court of Appeals award of special damages to the tune of One Million Four Hundred and Eighty-Seven Thousand Seven Hundred and Sixty-Seven Ghana Cedis Seventy-Three pesewas (GHS 1,487,767.73), all other orders by the Court of Appeal are equally upheld.