On the authorities and under section 7 (3) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) there was no non-statutory mandatory requirement that evidence had to be corroborated before the court could act on it. The test in every case was whether the evidence though given by a single witness was entitled to credit. In the instant case, even though there were other witnesses present at the time of the incident, it was not necessary to call all of them as witnesses. It was within the right of the plaintiff to call EA, an independent witness, to give evidence in her support. The trial judge therefore erred when he failed to consider whether he believed his evidence or not but rather rejected his evidence because he was a stranger. Since E A’s evidence amply corroborated the evidence of the plaintiff, the court would find that the first defendant called the plaintiff “a witch” without any provocation from the plaintiff. And furthermore, these words were not hurled against the plaintiff in the heat of a quarrel and were uttered in the presence of the co-tenants and EA. Commissioner of Police v Kwashie (1953) 14 W ACA 319; Kru v Saoud Bros. & Sons [1975] 1 GLR 46, CA and Republic v Munkaila [1996-97] SCGLR 445 cited.