Section 11(2) of NRCD 323 required proof beyond reasonable doubt only on the prosecution in criminal actions and in proof of a commis­sion of a crime in any civil or criminal action. And sections 11(4) and 12 of NRCD 323 clearly provided that the standard of proof in all civil actions, without exception, was proof by a preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly, the cases which had held that proof in title to land required proof beyond reasonable doubt no longer represented the present state of the law. In the instant case, both parties claimed title to the same land but the boundary owners who were called by the plaintiff testified in support of the boundary the plaintiff identified and the plaintiff’s ownership of the land. Thus, with the rejection of the Kwadason committee’s report upon which the defendant relied, there was no evidence in support of his counterclaim. Accordingly, on the balance of probabilities the plaintiff had succeeded in convincing the court that his claim to title was more probable than the defendant’s. Accordingly, the plaintiff would be declared the owner of the Duasi land.